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Abstract
Previous studies have documented that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) could
be a good tool to evaluate fund performance, especially the performance of hedge funds
as it can incorporate multiple risk-return attributes characterizing hedge fund’s non
normal return distribution in an unique performance score. The main purpose of this
paper is to generalize this framework and to extend the use of DEA to the context
of hedge fund selection when investors must face multi-dimensional constraints, each
one associated to a relative importance level. Unlike previous studies which used DEA
in an empirical framework, this research puts emphasis on methodological issues. I
showed that DEA can be a good tailor-made decision-making tool to assist investors in
selecting funds that correspond the most to their ﬁnancial, risk-aversion, diversiﬁcation
and investment horizon constraints.
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Author manuscript, published in "  (2006)"1 Introduction
The highly successful performance of the so-called hedge funds over the past two decades,
notably during the long bull equity market of the 1990s, has made them quickly well-known
to ﬁnancial communities as well as to the public. After several years of outstanding growth
(60% in 2000, 40% in 2001), the net inﬂow of money into this industry is still recorded at 15
% in 2004 to end at $1 trillion, and a growth rate of 10-15% is estimated for 20051. While
hedge funds still manage only a fraction of the $8 trillion invested by mutual funds, their
assets have ballooned from only about $150 billion a decade ago. The main reason behind
this magic success is that hedge funds are believed to be able to generate superior returns
regardless of market environment, and thus oﬀer investors a means to enhance returns,
reduce risk exposure and diversify portfolios invested in traditional assets. This argument
seems to be particularly attractive in the diﬃcult and highly volatile environment that has
prevailed in equity and monetary markets since the early 2000s.
This increasing multiplication of hedge fund industry makes the investment choice quite
challenging for investors. With over 8,000 hedge funds now available, investors need eﬃcient
tools to select the best funds in which to invest. In general, the selection of funds is assumed
to be essentially based on funds’ past performance, that is the ratio of returns adjusted to
risks. According to traditional ﬁnancial theories, investors make their investment choices
by considering simultaneously the returns approximated by the mathematical mean return
and the risks measured either by the return dispersion (represented by variance or standard
deviation) or by the correlation with the market (deﬁned by beta). Many of them though
validated in mutual fund and pension fund contexts might not be really adequate for hedge
funds. In fact, hedge fund returns are much diﬀerent from those of mutual fund and
pension fund ”buy-and-hold” portfolios in several ways2. On the one hand, they are usually
asymmetric and kurtotic, a characteristic largely imputed to the intensive use of short sales,
leverage, derivative instruments and to the free call-option like incentive fee structure, all
speciﬁc to only the hedge fund industry. On the other hand, their short-term movements
across diverse asset categories and the market neutral absolute investment objective of
hedge fund managers make it really delicate to identify market factors necessary to the
use of multi-factorial models3. Recent techniques enlarge the evaluation dimension to the
1According to a Morgan & Stanley’s report.
2Unlike other kinds of investment funds, hedge funds are loosely regulated, and in many cases, are largely
exempted from legal obligations as the case of oﬀshore hedge funds. Hedge fund managers thus have a broad
ﬂexibility in determining the proportion of securities they hold, the type of positions (long or short) they
take and the leverage level they make. As a consequence, they are free to make very short-term movements
across diverse asset categories involving frequent use of short sales, leverage and derivatives to attempt to
time the market.
3Betas and R









































6skewness or/and the kurtosis, and even other higher moments in order to take into account
the non normality of return distributions (see, for example, Sortino & Price (1994); Leland
(1999); Stutzer (2000); Keating & Shadwick (2002); Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003); etc.).
Yet, there are suggestions that actual selection criteria, in fact, may be more compli-
cated and diﬀer signiﬁcantly from theoretical formulations since there are more attributes
to consider, each one being associated with a priority level. Apart from risk-return charac-
teristics, investors are also concerned about funds’ performance over various time-horizon,
about lock-up period, incentive fees, manager’s reputation, manager’s seniority and perhaps
other qualitative criteria. In addition, although investors share the same selection criteria,
importance level that each investor attach to each criterion is not necessarily the same be-
cause each investor has his own budget, diversiﬁcation constraints, investment horizon and
consequently diﬀerent priorities. Even when fund selection is made solely on the basis of
their risk and return, given the wide variety of risk and return measures without no measure
absolutely dominant, an investor may want to consider several of them at the same time,
with or without particular interest ap r i o r ito one (some) among them.
The need to simultaneously consider several criteria while incorporating selector own
preferences is particularly important for institutional investors such as pension funds, mu-
tual funds or endowment funds whose clients do not usually share the same ﬁnancial objec-
tive, risk aversion, investment horizon, etc. From such a multi-objective decision-making
perspective, the Data Envelopment Analysis approach (hereafter, DEA) seems particularly
appealing as it provides the possibility of incorporating many criteria at the same time,
together with the control over the importance level paid to each criterion by means of a
tailor-made optimizing system. Unlike other performance measures, DEA does not provide
a complete ranking of funds. Instead, it only shares them out between eﬃcient (dominant)
and ineﬃcient (dominated) sets. The eﬃciency is simply relative to other funds in the
same category and thus can be changed once the considered sample is modiﬁed. Never-
theless, relative evaluation is a well-established concept in economic literature (Holmstrom
1982). Moreover, the relative property of fund evaluation is quite valuable because in the
investment industry, funds are often rated relatively to others in the same category and
investors are only interested in top-performing ones. A broad literature documented that
the investment fund market is a tournament and the managers compete against each other
in the same category to attract investors (see Brown et al. (1996); Agarwal et al. (2003);
Kristiansen (2005)). In addition, DEA is computationally simple and conceptually intu-
itive. These characteristics make DEA a powerful assistant tool in decision making and
explain the increasing enlargement of its application ﬁelds including engineering (to evalu-









































6establishments, etc.), commerce (to evaluate supermarkets) and ﬁnance (to evaluate bank
branches, institutions of micro-ﬁnance, stocks, etc.). Recently, it has been used to assess
empirically the relative performance of mutual funds and hedge funds4.
The main purpose of this research is to study how the DEA method can be adapted
to the context of hedge fund selection. Unlike previous works that used DEA to evaluate
empirically the performance of the hedge fund industry, I rather put emphasis on method-
ological aspects of fund selection when investors must face multiple constraints, each one
associated to a diﬀerent important level. I showed that DEA can be a good tailor-made
decision-making tool to assist investors in selecting funds that correspond the most to their
risk-aversion, ﬁnancial, diversiﬁcation and investment horizon constraints. To the best of
my knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to deal with this question.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a succinct review of studies
related to this research in section 2, section 3 introduces basic concepts of the DEA method.
Section 4 discusses the use of the DEA framework to select hedge funds, particularly the
choice of inputs, outputs, DEA models as well as formulating additional mathematical con-
straints to incorporate personal preferences towards inputs and outputs. Section 5 provides
some numerical illustrations from a sample including 38 hedge funds. Section 6 summarizes
and concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
This research emanated from two main streams of literature. The ﬁrst one concerns the
application of DEA into making a selection when decision-makers have multiple objectives.
The second is about the use of DEA to evaluate empirically the performance of investment
funds.
With respect to the ﬁrst literature, I refer especially to two important projects on siting
problems: Thompson et al. (1986) and Tone (1999). The former involves identifying feasible
sites among six candidate sites for location of a very high-energy physics lab in Texas. A
comparative site analysis was made by applying a DEA model under constant returns-to-
scale setting, incorporating project cost, user time delay, and environmental impact data.
The second project pertains to a huge long-range project with an initial budget more than 12
trillion yen (about 10 billion US dollars) of the Japanese government to transfer the political
functions of Tokyo to a new capital. The selection criteria include distance from Tokyo,









































6safety indexes regarding earthquakes and volcanoes, access to an international airport, ease
of land acquisition, landscape, water supply, matters with historical associations, etc.5.A
common interesting point of these two siting analyses is that the evaluators, basing on prior
expert knowledge about the relative importance of chosen criteria, ﬁxed lower and upper
bounds to the weights associated to each criterion in the mathematical optimization6.
The second literature which motivated my work is related to studies using DEA to
evaluate empirically the performance of mutual funds, ethical funds and more recently
hedge funds (see Table 1 for a summary). Studies on mutual funds include Murthi et al.
(1997), McMullen & Strong (1998), Choi & Murthi (2001)7, Basso & Funari (2001), Tarim
& Karan (2001) and Sengupta (2003). The common point of these work lies in supposing
that fund performance is a combination of multiple fund attributes such as mean returns
(outputs), risk (total or systematic) and expenses8, and sometimes even fund size, turnover
speed and minimum initial investment (inputs). Employing essentially basic DEA models
like CCR (Charnes et al. 1978) or BCC (Banker et al. 1984), they sought to compare the
eﬃciency of funds within a category or between several diﬀerent categories of funds.
In the same vein, Basso & Funari (2003) found that DEA is particularly adapted to
assess the performance of ethical mutual funds. They suggested including in the outputs
an indicator measuring funds’ ethical level fulﬁllments. As argued by the authors, ”the
solidarity and social responsibility features that characterize the ethical mutual funds satisfy
the fulﬁllment of humanitarian aims, but may lower the investment proﬁtability”. Hence,
we should not disregard the ethical component when evaluating ethical mutual funds.
The application of DEA in evaluating hedge funds emerged from the work of Gregoriou
(2003) and has been supported by Gregoriou et al. (2005)9 and Kooli et al. (2005). One
common point among these studies is considering only risk-return performance without
referring to fees. They approximated outputs (what investors seek to maximize) by right-
hand-side values of return distribution and inputs (what investors seek to minimize) by
left-hand-side values. Hence, the inputs include (1) lower mean monthly semi-skewness,
(2) lower mean monthly semi-variance, and (3) mean monthly lower return; the outputs
include (1) upper mean monthly semi-skewness, (2) upper mean monthly semi-variance,
5I didn’t have access to documents related to this project. All the information mentioned is extracted
from Cooper et al. (2000), p.169.
6A detailed example is presented in Appendix 1.
7Choi & Murthi (2001) is in fact the extended version of their seminal work (Murthi et al. 1997). In the
later version, the constant returns to scale assumption is replaced by the variable returns to scale.
8The concept of expenses diﬀers from study to study. It might include transaction costs and administra-
tion fees (totaled in expense ratio) and loads (subscription or/and redemption costs).
9Gregoriou et al. (2005) is an extended version of Gregoriou (2003) and more complete while employing
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6and (3) mean monthly upper return10. An another similarity is that they put emphasis
on an absolute ranking of funds by employing modiﬁed DEA techniques: super-eﬃciency
(Andersen & Petersen 1993) and cross-eﬃciency (Sexton et al. 1986). After comparing
DEA ranking results with those of Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe ratios by means of the
Spearman correlation coeﬃcient, they concluded that there was little consistency between
these measures. In particular, Kooli et al. (2005) compared fund ranking issued from DEA
technique with that of stochastic dominance and found a very low correlation between them,
which they considered as a weak power of DEA11.
3 DEA’s basic concept
3.1 Technical eﬃciency
First initiated by Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978) to assess the performance of educa-
tional organizations in the program ”Follow Through”, DEA can be roughly deﬁned as a
mathematical programming technique to measure the relative technical eﬃciency of similar
Decision-Making Units (hereafter DMU) which use multiple resources (inputs) to produce
multiple products or services (outputs). According to Fried, Lovell & Schmidt (1993, p.9-
10), ”productive eﬃciency has two components. The purely technical, or physical, com-
ponent refers to the ability to avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage
allows, or by using as little input as output production allows.... The allocative, or price, or
economic, component refers to the ability to combine inputs and outputs in optimal propor-
tions in light of prevailing prices.”. Consequently, technical eﬃciency measurement is based
solely on quantity information on the inputs and the outputs whereas the economic eﬃ-
ciency necessitates the recourse to information on prices as well as on economic behavioral
objective of producers (cost minimization, proﬁt maximization or revenue maximization).
Conceptually, in DEA, the eﬃciency of each DMU under evaluation is determined by the
distance from the point representing this DMU to the eﬃcient frontier (production frontier
in the case of technical eﬃciency; cost, revenue or proﬁt frontier in the case of cost, rev-
enue or proﬁt eﬃciency respectively.). In Figure 1, the isoquant L(y) represents the various
combinations of the two inputs that a perfectly eﬃcient ﬁrm like Q or Q  might use to
10The returns used are net returns already subtracted by 30-day US T-bill rate and deﬁned as the value-
added of funds.
11In DEA, each Decision Making Unit (DMU) can freely choose its own weighting system associated to
inputs and outputs to make it as eﬃcient as possible in comparison to the others. In other words, there
exists no common rule about weight limits for all DMUs. As a result, the original DEA model is not
appropriate to rank funds. Instead, it provides a dichotomy of eﬃcient and ineﬃcient DMUs. Although
the super-eﬃciency and cross-eﬃciency techniques are designed to classify completely DMUs, I am sceptical



















































Price Constraint Line 
Figure 1: Technical eﬃciency versus economic (cost) eﬃciency with two inputs
Source: Farrell (1957)
produce an unit of output; CC  with its slope equal to the ratio of the prices of the two
inputs represents the price constraints that all the ﬁrms must face. According to Farrell
(1957), OQ/OP is deﬁned as the technical eﬃciency, OR/OQ is the price (cost) eﬃciency
and OR/OP is the overall eﬃciency of the ﬁrm P12. In DEA, the production frontier
against which the (technical) eﬃciency13 of each DMU is derived is empirically constructed
from observed DMUs, and thus without any assumption on the functional relation between
inputs and outputs 14; that is, it is formed by a set of best practices (the most eﬃcient
DMUs) and the other DMUs are enveloped by this frontier, which explains the origin of the
name ”Data Envelopment Analysis” of this method.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 The primal program
Consider n DMUs under evaluation that use m inputs (X) to produce s outputs (Y )w i t h
X and Y are semipositive15. The eﬃciency score hk attributed to the DMU k is the solution
of the following optimizing system:
12For more details, see Farrell (1957).
13For the shake of brevity, hereafter I will refer only to ”eﬃciency” instead of ”technical eﬃciency”.
14In econometric methods, the eﬃcient frontier is estimated by supposing a particular form of the pro-
duction function (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, translog, etc.).
15The semipositivity signiﬁes that all data are nonnegative but at least one component of every input and
























































≤ 1, j =1 ,2 , ..., n (2)
ur, vi ≥ ε with r =1 ,2 , ..., s; i =1 ,2 ,..., m (3)
where: k is the DMU under evaluation, yrj is the amount of output r of the DMUj; xij
is the amount of input i of the DMUj; ur and vi are the weights assigned respectively to
output r and input i; ε is an inﬁnitesimal positive number, imposed to assure that no input
or output is being ignored during the optimization.
Mathematically, the model’s objective is to seek for the most favorable (positive) weight
system associated to each input and each output which maximizes the weighted sum of
the outputs over the weighted sum of the inputs, provided that the maximum value of this
ratio as well as this ratio of other DMUs do not exceed 1 (constraint (2)). Given that
the production frontier contains eﬃcient DMUs and envelopes ineﬃcient ones, and that the
eﬃciency level of each DMU is, by deﬁnition, the distance from its position to the production
frontier, it is natural to ﬁxe the maximal value of the objective function to unity16.T h u s
eﬃcient DMUs will obtain a score of 1 and ineﬃcient DMUs a score smaller than 1.
Conceptually, each DMU is free to choose its own combination of inputs and outputs so
that it is as desirable as possible relatively to other DMUs in the same category. Obviously,
this combination must also be technically ”feasible” for others, that is the eﬃciency level of
any other DMU using this combination should not exceed the maximum attainable bounded
by the production curve (the constraint (2) is also applied to j = 1,..., n with j  = k). The
idea is under this set of weights, if one DMU can not attain an eﬃciency rating of 100%
then it can never be attained from any other set. It should be noted that in practice, more
constraints on weight systems can be imposed to take into account speciﬁc preferences of
decision-makers. This point will be illustrated further in section 5.
Given the lack of common criteria in the evaluation process, it is important to keep in
mind that basic DEA models do only provide a dichotomic classiﬁcation, not a complete
16Mathematically, the maximal value of the objective function can be given any other number without
changing the relative eﬃciency of the DMUs. The choice of unity is to assure the coherence between









































6ranking; The DMUs are simply divided into two sets: one includes eﬃcient DMUs and the
other ineﬃcient ones.
According to Charnes & Cooper (1962, 1973) and Charnes et al. (1978), the fractional
problem (1-3) can be conveniently converted into an equivalent linear programming problem
by normalizing the denominator to one (
m 
i=1
vixik = 1). We obtain now the input-oriented














vixij, j = 1, 2, ..., n (10)
ur, vi ≥ ε ,r =1 ,2 , ..., s; i =1 ,2 , ..., m (11)
In order to obtain the eﬃciency scores of n DMUs, the equation system (8-11) must be run
n times with each time the DMU under evaluation changes.
3.2.2 The dual program
According to the linear programming theory, the system (8-11) has a dual equivalent for-
mulated as follows:



















vixij, j = 1, 2, ..., n (6)
ur, vi ≥ ε ; r =1 ,2 , ..., s; i =1 ,2 , ..., m (7)











































subject to: θxik ≥
n 
j=1




λjyrj, r = 1, ..., s (14)
λj ≥ 0, θ unconstrained in sign (15)
with θ and λ are dual variables. Note that θ can not, by construction, exceed unity18.
In economic terms, we are looking for a feasible activity - a virtual DMU which is a linear
combination of the best practice set - that guarantees the output level yk of the DMUk in all
components while using only a proportion of the DMUk’s inputs (θxik). Hence, θ is deﬁned
as a measure of the eﬃciency level of the DMUk. Graphically, in the input-output plan (see
Figure 2), θ (input-oriented or input contraction) of the DMU A is the ratio DC/DA19;
The virtual DMU which serves as benchmark to measure the eﬃciency of A is C.
In practice, the dual program is usually preferred to the primal because the resolution
of the former is computationally much more convenient due to a considerable reduction of
constraints, from n + s + m + 1 (in the primal) to s + m (in the dual), especially when
dealing with a large sample.
4 Hedge fund selection under the DEA framework
4.1 Selector’s preferences and the choice of inputs and outputs
In general, the selection of funds to invest in is essentially based on funds’ past perfor-
mance, that is the ratio of returns adjusted to risks. According to traditional ﬁnancial
theories, investors make their investment choices by considering simultaneously the returns
approximated by the mathematical mean return and the risks measured either by the return
dispersion (represented by variance or standard deviation) or by the correlation with the
market (deﬁned by beta), one risk measure at a time. Recent studies enlarge the evaluation
dimension to the skewness or/and the kurtosis, and even other higher moments in order
18We can easily see that θ =1 ,λk =1 ,λj =0( j  = k) is a feasible solution to (12-15). Hence, the optimal
value of θ can not be greater than 1. Besides, the constraint 13 implies that θ must be positive, since X is
required, by construction, to be semipositive.









































6to take into account the non normality of return distributions (see, for example, Sortino
& Price (1994); Leland (1999); Stutzer (2000); Keating & Shadwick (2002); Gregoriou &
Gueyie (2003); etc.).
Yet, there are suggestions that actual individual choices, in fact, may be more compli-
cated and diﬀer signiﬁcantly from theoretical formulations since there are more attributes
to consider, each one being associated with a priority level. While some investors might
be more concerned with central tendencies (mean, variance), others may care more about
extreme values (skewness, kurtosis). Let us consider the positive preference of individuals
for skewness ﬁrst invoked by Arditti (1967). It implies that individuals will be willing to
accept a lower expected value from his investment in portfolio A, than in portfolio B if
both portfolios have the same variance, and if portfolio A has greater positive skewness and
all higher moments are the same. In other words, individuals attach more importance to
the skewness than to the mean of returns. Similarly, McMullen & Strong (1998), Morey &
Morey (1999) and Powers & McMullen (2000) documented that investors are also concerned
about fund’s performances over various time-horizons (1 year, 3 years, 5 years and some-
times 10 years) because they provides much more informative insight into fund’s perspective
than the performance over only one horizon. It is of a particular interest when investors
have diﬀerent investment horizons and risk-return parameters vary greatly from horizon to
horizon (Nguyen-Thi-Thanh 2004). Basso & Funari (2003) argued that some categories of
investors may also include ethical criteria (categorical variable) in decision-making process
in order to satisfy their ethical need while others are interested in transaction costs and
administration fees incurred by funds (Murthi et al. (1997); McMullen & Strong (1998);
Choi & Murthi (2001); Sengupta (2003)). In the case of gross returns (before all fees
pre-cited), the justiﬁcation for including fees in fund evaluation is direct. But even when
returns are net of all fees, fee consideration can still provide additional information about
the manager’s performance. As claimed by Choi & Murthi (2001), although having the
same variance, a fund with 15% of gross returns and 5% of fees is not really comparable
to another fund which yields 12% of gross returns at 2% of fees. Given the higher gross
historical performance of the ﬁrst fund in comparison with the second, one might hope
that the ﬁrst will have more chance to achieve a better performance in the future than the
second, and rightly so. In addition, investors undoubtedly care about fund manager proﬁle
such as reputation, seniority, education level, etc., those documented as having substantial
eﬀects on fund performance.
In the context of the hedge fund industry, along with these attributes, it is also important
for a potential investor to consider (sometimes simultaneously) other characteristics speciﬁc









































6incentive fees required by fund managers. Although recently a lot of registered hedge
funds, especially funds of funds, have lowered signiﬁcantly the minimum investment (some
lower than $50,000) to enlarge their clientele to the public, this number is quite modest
compared to an universe of up to 8,000 funds. Regarding the lock-up period, it is ﬁxed, on
average, about one year but varies greatly from funds to funds - from three months to as
long as ﬁve years. These requirements form a veritable barrier to the portfolio diversifying
task of both institutional and individual investors. Another feature that makes hedge fund
selection more complex is the incentive fee scheme. Unlike other types of investment funds,
hedge fund managers require incentive fees20 in addition to administration fees which is
in percentage of assets under management (about 1%, sometimes 6%). As the hedge fund
industry is loosely regulated and in many cases exempted from many investment regulations
applied to other kinds of funds, fee ﬁxation is at will of managers. Consequently, incentive
fees are very dispersed, ranging from as low as 0% to 50% (Ackermann et al. 1999).
Although recent performance measures make it possible to deal with higher moments
than the mean and variance, they do not satisfy the need of investors to consider other
attributes than the performance like those mentioned above. Even when fund selection is
made solely on the basis of their risk and return, given the wide variety of risk and return
measures without no measure absolutely dominant, an investor may want to consider several
of them at the same time, with or without particular interest ap r i o r ito one (some) among
them. Very often, selection criteria diﬀer across investors. In the case where selection criteria
are common, importance level that each investor attach to each criteria is not necessarily
the same because each investor has his own budget and diversiﬁcation constraints and
consequently diﬀerent priorities. This ﬂexibility is particularly important for institutional
investors such as pension funds, mutual funds or endowment funds whose clients do not
usually share the same ﬁnancial objective, risk aversion, investment horizon, etc. In this
regard, DEA is a good tool to assist investors in multi-criteria problem of selecting the most
appropriate funds to invest in. The merit of this technique lies in the possibility for fund
selectors to construct a personalized tool that incorporates their own preference structure
regarding fund selection criteria. These preferences are introduced both by the choice of
parameters to include in the inputs and the outputs and by setting additional constraints on
absolute or on virtual weights21 in the optimizing program. For instance, investors without
20In the incentive fee scheme, the managers earn a pre-deﬁned percentage of the net returns (on average
20%) above a certain threshold named ”hurdle rate” (often ﬁxed about 5%). Besides, hedge fund managers
ought to recover their past loss (if any) before charging incentive fees, a mechanism known under the name
”high water mark”.
21Absolute weights indicate simply normal multipliers, in this case u and v, which are opposed to virtual
weights denoting the product of absolute weights times input/output quantities. For a discussion about









































6fee or fund lock-up constraints might look only at fund performance. Consequently, only
return and risk parameters intervene in decision-making process with returns in the outputs
and risks in the inputs. If investors want to consider simultaneously several return or/and
risk measures and care more about one or some indicators than the others, they can set
constraints that the multipliers associated to the former are greater that the multiplier
associated to the latter. Based on his preferences or his prior beliefs about the importance
of each input and output, one can also limit the deﬁnition ﬁeld of these multipliers to a
certain interval. This point will be illustrated later by further numerical examples.
Once selection criteria have been speciﬁed, the next step is to choose an appropriate
setting to construct the reference production frontier or the eﬃciency envelope. This issue
is addressed in the next section.
4.2 The choice of the eﬃciency envelope
The assumptions on underlying production technology are of particular importance in eval-
uating the relative productive eﬃciency of manufacturing DMUs. The original DEA model
- the so-called CCR model, as presented in Section 2, assumes a constant returns to scale
(CRS) technology. This assumption may be acceptable in some cases but is of little realism
regarding economic theory of production. To mitigate this strong assumption, Banker et al.
(1984)(hereafter, BCC) introduced a method to measure relative eﬃciency in a variable re-
turns to scale (VRS) environment by making slight modiﬁcations in the optimizing program








vixik = 1 (17)
s 
r=1
uryrj − uo ≤
m 
i=1
vixij, j = 1, 2, ..., n (18)
ur, vi ≥ ε ; r =1 ,2 , ..., s; i =1 ,2 , ..., m (19)
The VRS is reﬂected in the value of uo.I fuo = 0, we are in a CRS environment. uo > 0
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Figure 2: Production frontiers and eﬃciency measurement of the CCR and BCC models
The primal system (16-19) is equivalent to the following dual:
min θ (20)
subject to: θxik ≥
n 
j=1




λjyrj, r = 1, ..., s (22)
n 
j=1
λj = 1 (23)
λj ≥ 0, θ unconstrained in sign (24)
The constraint (23) implies that the referenced DMU of the analyzed DMU is a convex
linear combination of eﬃcient DMUs while this is not the case in CCR program. Figure
2 illustrates how this additional constraint modiﬁes the eﬃciency frontier. Graphically,
the frontier is no longer a line but a piece-wise linear curve. This is because in CCR
model, only the most eﬃcient DMUs with eﬃcient scale sizes (for their given inputs and
outputs mixes) - like the DMU3-c a nl i eo nt h ee ﬃ c i e n c yf r o n t i e r ,t h o s ef o r m i n gt h e
BCC eﬃciency frontier (as the DMUs 1, 2 and 4) do not necessarily operate at the most
eﬃcient scales. Consequently, the BCC model measures the pure technical eﬃciency of
DMUs at the given scale of operation (DB/DA) while the CCR model estimates the overall
technical eﬃciency (DC/DA). The diﬀerence between these two values approximates the
scale eﬃciency (DC/DB). As a result, there are more eﬃcient DMUs under BCC setting









































6Put in the production context, the BCC variable returns to scale model is obviously
more realistic than the CCR constant returns to scale one. However, when DMUs to be
evaluated are not manufacturing ones, where the inputs and outputs are selection criteria
and not physical elements, justifying for using CCR or BCC models is not easy. Thompson
et al. (1986) used CCR model to choose a site for locating a high-energy physics lab in Texas
without having recourse to BCC model. In contrast, Powers & McMullen (2000) applied
the BCC model to select eﬃcient large market securities. The question that which model
is more appropriate to this context, to the best of my knowledge, is still unanswered.
4.3 Negative inputs and outputs
DEA models as designed to measure the eﬃciency of production DMUs require that inputs
and outputs are semipositive. In production economics, negative inputs and outputs make
no sense. However, in fund selection context, it is likely that we sometimes have negative
values like mean, skewness of returns, or returns of some lower quartiles, etc. This problem
can be easily solved without any modiﬁcation of the eﬃciency envelope in several ways.
When negative values are only present in some outputs (inputs), input-oriented (output-
oriented) DEA models are required so that optimizing systems like (1-3) and (4-7) remain
always soluble without modifying the original eﬃcient set. Note that under the CRS setting,
eﬃciency scores of input-oriented and output-oriented are equivalent while they are slightly
diﬀerent under the VRS. An other alternative consists of increasing the output yrj (input
xij) of all other DMUs in the sample by a value of ϕr (ψi):
 xij = xij + ψi with j =1 ,...,n
OR  yrj = yrj + ϕr ; j =1 ,...,n
such that the transformed data is all positive. According to Gregoriou & Zhu (2005), the
eﬃciency frontier remains the same if xij and yrj are replaced by  xij and  yrj. In this case,
either input-oriented models or output-oriented models can be employed.
However, when both input and output sets have negative data, only the solution of
transforming data is possible. In a similar manner, the choice of input or output-oriented









































65 Hedge fund selection: Illustrative applications
5.1 Data
To illustrate the use of DEA in selecting hedge funds, I used a sample of 38 hedge funds
belonging to the category Equity Hedge22. Data includes 60 monthly returns covering the
period of january 2000 to december 2004. Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of
these funds.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Fund name Min Max Mean SD SK KU S-W K-S J-B
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1 IKOS Equity -6.16 10.20 0.68 3.77 0.34 -0.35 0.98 0.11 1.43
2 Enterprise Lng/Shrt Eq -7.89 7.69 0.16 3.33 -0.07 -0.25 0.99 0.06 0.20
3 Galleon Omni Tech. A -12.51 19.66 -0.30 5.59 0.32 1.86 0.95** 0.12 9.72***
4 Primeo Select -7.25 5.63 0.25 3.04 -0.27 -0.49 0.98 0.07 1.31
5 Gabelli Intl A -11.37 11.95 0.10 4.65 -0.10 0.09 0.99 0.06 0.12
6 GAM Japan Hedge Open -6.50 5.92 0.06 2.34 -0.36 0.29 0.98 0.08 1.50
7 Foyil Focused -14.67 24.36 -0.11 6.23 0.91 3.37 0.95*** 0.11 36.60***
8 Gruber & McBaine Cap -22.96 33.89 -0.18 8.86 0.71 2.69 0.96** 0.06 23.09***
9 GAM Selection -7.87 8.59 -0.01 3.92 -0.01 -0.43 0.98 0.07 0.46
10 SR Asia -11.84 13.05 0.03 5.40 0.16 -0.12 0.99 0.08 0.29
11 AJR International -8.19 17.11 1.08* 4.95 1.18 2.13 0.92*** 0.16* 25.40***
12 Liberty Ermitage Selz -13.49 9.11 0.01 4.35 -0.43 0.66 0.98 0.08 2.98
13 Momentum Stock Master -6.77 7.23 -0.57 3.36 0.12 -0.75 0.98 0.07 1.53
14 Park Place Intl Columbia -40.85 19.45 -0.73 9.02 -1.42 5.88 0.90*** 0.15 106.6***
15 Permal US Opportunities -12.04 14.17 0.23 5.53 -0.05 0.06 0.98 0.07 0.03
16 Wimbledon Class M -5.76 6.58 0.24 2.83 0.13 -0.22 0.99 0.06 0.29
17 Wimbledon Class C -7.10 6.27 0.33 3.25 -0.15 -0.49 0.98 0.06 0.83
18 Absolute Alpha Oppt. -6.33 5.94 0.15 2.65 0.00 -0.33 0.99 0.08 0.28
19 IKOS Oﬀshore Arbitrage -7.21 8.18 0.25 3.43 0.17 -0.46 0.99 0.06 0.81
20 Sofaer Capital Global A -9.90 14.45 0.12 4.54 0.25 0.71 0.99 0.05 1.91
21 Lansdowne Europe -6.81 9.77 0.64* 2.75 0.48 2.08 0.96* 0.10 13.19***
22 Park Place Europe $ -9.20 7.57 -0.23 3.95 -0.09 -0.38 0.99 0.05 0.44
23 Park Place Europe -5.31 6.82 0.33 2.48 0.62 0.59 0.96** 0.15 4.66***
24 HSBC Selection Euro -13.75 15.03 -0.81 5.72 -0.10 0.30 0.98 0.09 0.33
25 Park Place Galileo Intl -9.78 19.59 0.09 5.46 1.35 3.85 0.90*** 0.12 55.13***
26 Leonardo Capital -16.34 25.90 1.34 * 5.31 1.35 10.02 0.72*** 0.24*** 269.3***
27 Key Europe -1.24 5.45 0.52*** 1.10 1.64 5.81 0.88 *** 0.17* 111.2 ***
28 TR Kingsway A -2.37 15.86 0.74 ** 2.39 4.36 27.27 0.63 *** 0.19** 2050***
29 SVM Highlander -15.48 22.37 0.64 5.07 1.23 7.06 0.85 *** 0.16* 139.7***
30 SR Europe USD -13.76 17.90 -0.35 5.29 0.50 1.86 0.97 0.09 11.22***
31 SR Europe EURO -14.30 17.93 0.28 5.00 0.21 2.69 0.95** 0.10 18.58***
32 GAM Europe Hedge Open -6.93 11.54 0.00 3.15 0.73 2.47 0.96** 0.08 20.64***
33 Lansdowne Europe Equity $ -7.88 11.53 0.08 4.07 0.58 0.71 0.97 0.08 4.57
34 Aspect European Equity -7.12 8.67 -0.07 4.12 0.20 -0.64 0.97 0.08 1.42
35 Zulauf Europe -5.68 10.93 1.10*** 2.97 0.38 1.30 0.96 * 0.12 5.66*
36 Zulauf Europe $ -10.13 7.95 0.58 3.75 -0.29 -0.05 0.98 0.08 0.82
37 Sofaer Capital Europe -6.48 11.01 0.38 2.60 0.71 4.25 0.93 *** 0.10 50.14***
38 Sofaer Capital Europe $ -9.93 12.48 -0.13 4.10 0.04 0.71 0.98 0.07 1.26
SD = Standard deviation, SK = Skewness, KU = Kurtosis excess relatively to the normal distribution,
S-W = Shapiro-Wilk, K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov, J-B = Jarque-Bera are normality tests on return distributions.
***: Rejection of the normality assumption at the 99% conﬁdence level,
**: Rejection of the normality assumption at the 95% conﬁdence level,
*: Rejection of the normality assumption at the 90% conﬁdence level.
22These 38 funds are extracted from a database provided by the company Standard & Poor’s. Equity
Hedge covers several diﬀerent strategies whose investments are focused on the equity markets. Its two large









































6As we can see, return distributions of many funds show highly positive (negative) skew-
ness signifying higher probability of extreme positive (negative) values relatively to the
normal distribution. Besides, many of them possess high kurtosis excess, which indicates
more returns close to the central value but also more regular large positive or negative
returns than a normal distribution. The normality assumption of return distributions is
tested by means of three tests: Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and Jarque-Bera. Re-
sults according to the Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-Bera tests are quite similar although they
are much diﬀerent from those provided by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. This divergence
is likely due to the sample’s limit size as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more appropriate
to large samples. According to the Shapiro-Wilk test, documented as the most reliable
for small samples, the normality assumption is rejected in 14 out of 38 cases at the con-
ﬁdence level of 95%. These ﬁndings imply much higher gain or risk of these funds than
approximated under normality assumption, and highlight the importance of incorporating
moments of order higher than the mean and variance when appraising their gain and risk
proﬁles.
5.2 Methodology
Due to unavailable data on other characteristics of funds (lock-up period, manager proﬁle,
minimum investment, incentive fees, etc.) in the sample used, illustrations are limited
to considering their return and risk proﬁles. This framework is plausible by assuming a
category of investors who are only concerned about funds’ performance without facing any
other constraints. This future performance is approximated by historical risk and return
parameters which are unique selection criteria. Since the distribution of hedge fund returns
is documented as usually non gaussian, i.e. asymmetric and having fat tails, it is important
to incorporate these features into the selection of inputs and outputs. Several settings are
likely.
I ﬁrst considered the case where investors have a positive preference for odd moments
and a negative preference for event moments. In this spirit, outputs can be mean and
skewness of returns where inputs can be standard deviation and kurtosis of returns.
Alternatively, as suggested by Gregoriou et al. (2005) and Kooli et al. (2005), it seems
more clever to reason in terms of partial variations. In reality, investors are likely to be averse
only to variations under the Minimum Accepted Return (MAR)23, which are called lower
variations, and appreciate those above this value, which are called upper variations. Thus,
23The determination of the Minimum Accepted Return is purely subjective and speciﬁc to each investor.









































6input and output parameters can also be determined in the following manner. The inputs
include lower mean, lower semi-standard deviation, lower semi-skewness and lower semi-
kurtosis. The outputs contain upper mean, upper semi-standard deviation, upper semi-
skewness and upper semi-kurtosis. The method of computing these inputs and outputs is
reported in Appendix 2. Besides, as discussed earlier, it is also possible that some categories
of investors care more about extreme values than central tendencies. This preference can be
taken into account by adding four more constraints on weight vectors into the optimization
system:
y3ju3  y1ju1 ; x3jv3  x1jv1
y3ju3  y2ju2 ; x3jv3  x2jv2
y4ju4  y1ju1 ; x4jv4  x1jv1
y4ju4  y2ju2 ; x4jv4  x2jv2
where y1j,y 2j,y 3j,y 4j are the amount of upper mean, upper standard deviation, upper
skewness and upper kurtosis of the fund j under consideration; x1j,x 2j,x 3j,x 4j are the
amount of its lower mean, lower standard deviation, lower skewness and lower kurtosis.
u1,u 2,u 3,u 4,v 1,v 2,v 3,v 4 are the weights associated respectively to these outputs and in-
puts. Conceptually, these additional constraints require that the contribution of the upper
and lower skewness and kurtosis to the performance score of the fund j must be greater
than the contribution of the upper and lower mean and standard deviation.
Otherwise, if investors care uniquely about extreme events rather than ordinary ones, i.e.
distribution tails rather than central values, representing inputs and outputs respectively by
the ﬁrst (lower) quantiles (what investors want to minimize) and the last (upper) quantiles
(what investors want to maximize) can be a viable alternative. It is noteworthy that from a
statistical viewpoint, the use of quantile-based metrics is especially useful and robust when
historical returns are not long enough or returns are skewed and contain outliers24. In this
spirit, I also considered a scenario where inputs are the ﬁrst 5%, 10%, 15% and then 20%
of the return distribution (lower quartiles) and outputs are determined in a similar manner
with corresponding upper quantiles - 95%, 90%, 85% and 80%.
In order to illustrate another case where an investor needs to reconcile funds’ perfor-
mance over several horizons (from a long time in the past to a more recent period) while still
regarding non normal characteristics of returns, I modeled inputs by the modiﬁed Value-
At-Risk (MVAR) (Favre & Galeano 2002) representing the loss limits and outputs by mean









































6returns over three horizons: 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. The merit of the MVAR is that it































with W is the amount of portfolio at risk, µ is return mean, σ is the standard deviation of
returns, S is skewness, K is excess kurtosis, zc is the critical value for probability (1 − α)
(zc = −1.96 for a 95% probability).
As there exists no other preferences of the evaluator, no additional constraint on the
weight vectors is needed.
After inputs and outputs corresponding to evaluator preferences are speciﬁed, the next
step consists in running the foregoing inputs and outputs under the CCR model. For each
model, the weights associated to each output and input are constrained to be equal or
greater than 0.01 (ε =0 .01)25 to assure that all criteria are considered in the optimization
program.
5.3 Results
Table 3 displays detailed results on DEA score, absolute weights (u, v) and virtual weights
(uy, vx) obtained under a CCR setting with mean and skewness as outputs, standard
deviation and kurtosis as inputs. Funds with negative scores are those having simultaneously
negative mean and negative skewness. Given the diﬀerence of unit between mean, standard
deviation on the one hand and skewness, kurtosis on the other hand, virtual weights rather
than absolute weights provide more informative identiﬁcation of key factors (inputs and
outputs) that make some funds (1, 11, 27, 28, 35) eﬃcient relatively to others in the sample.
By contrasting these results to the statistics of returns given in Table 2, we notice that fund
27 and fund 35 are considered as eﬃcient because they have fairly high mean and small
standard deviation in comparison with the others, which results quite important weights
assigned to these elements. By contrast, the relative eﬃciency of fund 28 is due to the
height weight associated to its positive skewness. In fact, this fund has the highest positive
skewness among funds in the sample. It is important to keep in mind that not all eﬃcient
funds ﬁt the selector’s preferences as each eﬃcient fund possesses its own weighting system
which is a function of its relatively favorable inputs and outputs. An investor who is more
25In fact, all calculations were already tested with 4 increasing values of ε: 0, 0.0001, 0.001 and 0.01. How-
ever, the performance scores changed very slightly while the relative rank between funds remains unchanged.









































6or less markowitzian should be in favor of fund 27 or fund 35 while those willing to sacriﬁce
some mean in exchange for some extremely high returns (positive skewness) should choose
fund 28.
Table 3: DEA detailed results using mean-skewness as outputs
and standard deviation-kurtosis as inputs (moment-based)
Fund name Scorea Absolute Weights (u, v)b Virtual Weights (u*y, v*x)
Mean SK SD KU Mean SK SD KU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 IKOS Equity 1 146.98 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.997 0.003 0.008 0.992
2 Enterprise Lng/Shrt Eq 0.23 141.60 0.01 0.21 0.36 0.228 -0.001 0.007 0.993
3 Galleon Omni Tech. A 0.29 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.21 0.000 0.286 0.001 0.999
4 Primeo Select 0.39 155.48 0.01 0.22 0.40 0.388 -0.003 0.007 0.993
5 Gabelli Intl A 0.13 125.88 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.127 -0.001 0.001 1.000
6 GAM Japan Hedge Open 0.07 118.94 0.01 0.18 0.30 0.077 -0.004 0.004 0.996
7 Foyil Focused 0.62 0.01 0.68 0.01 0.16 0.000 0.618 0.001 0.999
8 Gruber & McBaine Cap 0.54 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.18 0.000 0.537 0.001 0.999
9 GAM Selection -0.00 0.01 0.01 24.87 0.01 0.000 0.000 0.974 0.026
10 SR Asia 0.24 0.01 1.51 0.01 0.35 0.000 0.240 0.001 1.000
11 AJR International 1 66.71 0.24 1.28 0.18 0.719 0.281 0.064 0.937
12 Liberty Ermitage Selz -0.00 106.35 0.01 0.17 0.27 0.006 -0.004 0.007 0.993
13 Momentum Stock Master 0.22 0.01 1.92 0.01 0.44 0.000 0.222 0.000 1.000
14 Park Place Intl Columbia -0.01 0.01 0.01 10.10 0.01 0.000 -0.014 0.911 0.089
15 Permal US Opportunities 0.29 127.28 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.294 -0.001 0.001 0.999
16 Wimbledon Class M 0.35 122.73 0.44 2.36 0.34 0.290 0.057 0.067 0.933
17 Wimbledon Class C 0.51 155.09 0.01 0.22 0.39 0.513 -0.002 0.007 0.993
18 Absolute Alpha Opportunistic 0.21 146.46 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.214 0.000 0.006 0.994
19 IKOS Oﬀshore Arbitrage 0.41 126.42 0.56 0.01 0.39 0.318 0.094 0.000 1.000
20 Sofaer Capital Global A 0.30 0.01 1.17 0.01 0.27 0.000 0.297 0.001 1.000
21 Lansdowne Europe 0.68 68.22 0.51 15.01 0.12 0.438 0.246 0.412 0.588
22 Park Place Europe $ -0.00 0.01 0.01 24.65 0.01 0.000 -0.001 0.974 0.026
23 Park Place Europe 0.79 0.01 1.29 6.88 0.23 0.000 0.793 0.171 0.829
24 HSBC Selection Euro Equity - 0.00 0.01 0.01 16.90 0.01 0.000 -0.001 0.967 0.033
25 Park Place Galileo Intl 0.89 0.01 0.66 3.52 0.12 0.000 0.888 0.192 0.808
26 Leonardo Capital 0.70 29.62 0.22 6.52 0.05 0.397 0.298 0.346 0.654
27 Key Europe 1 190.54 0.01 83.05 0.01 0.984 0.016 0.912 0.088
28 TR Kingsway A 1 13.89 0.21 29.18 0.01 0.102 0.898 0.697 0.303
29 SVM Highlander 0.59 0.01 0.48 2.58 0.09 0.000 0.592 0.131 0.869
30 SR Europe $ 0.45 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.21 0.000 0.448 0.001 1.000
31 SR Europe 0.21 60.50 0.22 1.16 0.17 0.166 0.046 0.058 0.942
32 GAM Europe Hedge Open 0.64 0.01 0.87 4.65 0.16 0.000 0.639 0.146 0.854
33 Lansdowne Europe Equity $ 0.67 0.01 1.17 0.01 0.27 0.000 0.675 0.000 1.000
34 Aspect European Equity 0.36 0.01 1.84 0.01 0.42 0.000 0.361 0.000 1.000
35 Zulauf Europe 1 90.94 0.01 31.40 0.02 0.996 0.004 0.931 0.069
36 Zulauf Europe $ 0.77 131.96 0.01 0.20 0.34 0.771 -0.003 0.007 0.993
37 Sofaer Capital Europe 0.50 55.54 0.41 12.22 0.09 0.208 0.294 0.318 0.683
38 Sofaer Capital Europe $ 0.04 0.01 1.17 0.01 0.27 0.000 0.044 0.000 1.000
Note: SD = Standard deviation, SK = Skewness, KU = Kurtosis.
aFunds with negative scores are those having simultaneously negative mean and negative skewness.
bu and v are constrained to be equal or greater than 0.01. For further explanations, refer to p.20.
Results on DEA scores across various sets of inputs and outputs are summarized in Table
4. Note that funds with negative scores are those whose outputs are all negative. Several
points are noteworthy. In general, eﬃciency results are rather sensitive to the choice of
input and output parameters. Not only the number of dominant funds26 varies across









































6scenarios – 3 according to the (partial moment-based) weight-restricted model (column 3)
to 5 according to the standard partial moment-based model (column 2) and the standard
moment-based model (column 1) – but also dominant members diﬀer across tested sets of
inputs-outputs. Look at for example fund 25 that is considered as eﬃcient only by the
standard partial moment-based model (column 2).
Regarding the introduction of additional constraints on weight vectors in the partial
moment-based model (p.19), I found that attaching more importance to tail values rather
than central values generally deteriorates slightly eﬃciency scores but in some cases alters
radically the subgroup to which funds belong, i.e. from eﬃcient to ineﬃcient subgroup
(columns 2 and 3). For instance, funds 11 and 25 do not belong to the dominant group
anymore once weight restriction constraints are added.
These ﬁndings highlight the importance of the choice of appropriate inputs and outputs
as well as of a correct speciﬁcation of additional constraints corresponding eﬀectively to the
selectors’ preferences. In all cases, results must be interpreted with caution.
Besides, despite this general disparity, I noticed a certain concordance in fund (dichoto-
mous) classiﬁcation for several funds as 11, 26, 27, 28, 35. Let us look at fund 28. Whatever
set of inputs and outputs used, it is always considered as dominant. This feature can be
considered as a sign of the robustness of fund 28’s relative performance.
Since we are situated in the case where investors are assumed to be concerned about
only funds’ return and risk, it can be interesting to contrast DEA results with fund rankings
provided by the traditional Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) and the recent modiﬁed Sharpe ratio









where rp is the average return on fund p, rf is the average risk-free rate approximated here
by the US 3-month T-bill rate, MVAR is described by equation (25). Note that the Sharpe
ratio is based on the mean-variance paradigm while the modiﬁed Sharpe ratio takes into
account skewness and kurtosis of returns.
Fund rankings according to these two ratios are reported in the columns 6 and 7 of Table
4. Several main observations can be drawn from these results. We can see easily that despite










































6Table 4: DEA, Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe ranking results
Fund name Moment Partial momentsa Quantile Horizon Sharpe M-Sharpe
-b a s e db Standard WR - basedc -b a s e d d ranking ranking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 IKOS Equity 1 0.91 0.87 0.79 0.40 7 7
2 Enterprise Lng/Shrt Eq 0.23 0.78 0.76 0.58 0.41 18 18
3 Galleon Omni Tech. A 0.29 0.92 0.91 0.35 -0.00 33 34
4 Primeo Select 0.39 0.76 0.74 0.60 0.16 14 15
5 Gabelli Intl A 0.13 0.80 0.78 0.52 0.08 21 20
6 GAM Japan Hedge Open 0.07 0.72 0.71 0.51 0.91 29 28
7 Foyil Focused 0.62 0.93 0.92 0.52 0.17 27 29
8 Gruber & McBaine Cap 0.54 1 1 0.57 0.11 25 26
9 GAM Selection -0.00 0.83 0.80 0.50 0.21 28 27
10 SR Asia 0.24 0.86 0.82 0.51 0.11 23 23
11 AJR International 1 1 0.96 0.90 0.75 5 4
12 Liberty Ermitage Selz 0.00 0.75 0.73 0.46 0.23 26 25
13 Momentum Stock Master 0.22 0.78 0.76 0.46 -0.00 38 38
14 Park Place Intl Columbia -0.01 0.74 0.72 0.44 1 34 31
15 Permal US Opportunities 0.29 0.89 0.87 0.51 0.08 17 17
16 Wimbledon Class M 0.35 0.78 0.76 0.63 0.22 16 16
17 Wimbledon Class C 0.51 0.81 0.72 0.66 0.61 12 12
18 Absolute Alpha Opportunistic 0.21 0.76 0.74 0.61 0.12 22 21
19 IKOS Oﬀshore Arbitrage 0.41 0.82 0.80 0.65 0.16 15 14
20 Sofaer Capital Global A 0.30 0.86 0.82 0.52 1 19 19
21 Lansdowne Europe 0.68 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.63 6 6
22 Park Place Europe $ -0.00 0.87 0.73 0.53 -0.00 36 35
23 Park Place Europe 0.79 0.91 0.74 0.71 0.19 11 11
24 HSBC Selection Euro Equity -0.00 0.85 0.83 0.33 0.48 37 37
25 Park Place Galileo Intl 0.89 1 0.97 0.50 0.04 20 22
26 Leonardo Capital 0.70 0.89 0.89 1 1 4 5
27 Key Europe 1 1 1 1 0.87 2 2
28 TR Kingsway A 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
29 SVM Highlander 0.59 0.88 0.85 0.63 0.36 9 8
30 SR Europe $ 0.45 0.92 0.83 0.45 0.31 35 36
31 SR Europe 0.21 0.88 0.81 0.50 0.68 13 13
32 GAM Europe Hedge Open 0.64 0.84 0.84 0.43 0.15 30 32
33 Lansdowne Europe Equity $ 0.67 0.93 0.83 0.50 0.24 24 24
34 Aspect European Equity 0.36 0.89 0.83 0.58 -0.00 31 30
35 Zulauf Europe 1 0.85 0.83 1 0.94 1 3
36 Zulauf Europe $ 0.77 0.86 0.72 0.81 0.32 8 9
37 Sofaer Capital Europe 0.50 0.84 0.83 0.54 0.39 10 10
38 Sofaer Capital Europe $ 0.04 0.81 0.80 0.50 -0.00 32 33
Number of dominant funds 5 5 3 4 4
Correlation (Sharpe,M-Sharpe) 0.995
Note: All DEA eﬃciency scores are obtained from the standard CCR model.
aThe partial moment-based set includes upper mean, upper standard deviation, upper skewness and
upper kurtosis as outputs, lower mean, lower standard deviation, lower skewness and lower kurtosis as
inputs (see Appendix 2). Standard denotes optimization without additional constraints on weights. WR
implies optimization with additional constraints on virtual weights (see p.19).
bThe moment-based set denotes the use of mean and skewness as outputs, standard deviation and
kurtosis as inputs. Funds with negative eﬃciency score are those having simultaneously negative mean
and negative skewness.
cThe quantile-based set includes the ﬁrst 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% of the return distribution as inputs,
and corresponding upper quantiles 95%, 90%, 85% and 80% as outputs.
dThe horizon-based set includes mean returns over 1 year, 3 years and 5 years as outputs and corre-
sponding modiﬁed VARs as inputs. Funds with negative scores are those having simultaneously negative









































6similar, both in terms of correlation coeﬃcient (0.995) and in terms of rank contrasting in
couples from fund to fund. Does this strong similarity imply that the return distribution
of all funds is quite close to the normal one? The answer according to the Shapiro-Wilk
normality test is rather negative because the normality assumption is rejected in 14 among
38 cases at the conﬁdence level of 95% (Table 2). However, ﬁnding explanations to such
problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Related to the connexion of DEA classiﬁcations with Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe rank-
ings, the results show that most dominant funds (except for those classiﬁed by the horizon-
based model) are generally among the seven funds the most highly ranked by Sharpe and
modiﬁed Sharpe ratios. Nevertheless, funds 8 and 25 – considered as dominant under the
standard partial moment-based model – are ranked only in the middle of the sample by the
two performance measures. A closer examination of their return distributions shows that
this contradiction is likely due to the much wider dispersal of returns and higher frequency
of extreme positive values in these two distributions than in those of other funds. This ﬁnd-
ing implies that Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe ratios might not price properly good surprises,
at least in the case of this sample. As a result, investors would have missed top-performing
funds. Such a result supports the claim that DEA can be an eﬃcient supplementary tool
to assist investors in selecting correctly funds satisfying their preferences.
5.4 Eﬃciency stability analysis
Once eﬃcient and ineﬃcient funds are identiﬁed, it is also very important to examine the
robustness of the DEA-eﬃcient funds under possible unfavorable changes27. Speciﬁcally, it
is desirable to determine the range of worsening inputs and outputs (a decrease in outputs
or/and an increase in inputs) within which an eﬃcient fund remains eﬃcient. The need
for a sensitivity analysis of eﬃcient funds can be justiﬁed in two diﬀerent manners. At one
level, results may be subject to erroneous data and we need to ensure that the obtained
classiﬁcation is tolerated within a certain extent. At another level, the knowledge about the
stability region of eﬃcient DMUs is valuable to assess their ”what-if” robustness throughout
various environment changes. In this sense, such kind of sensitivity can be a complementary
tool to diﬀerentiate eﬃcient funds and helps evaluators to choose the best ones.
For illustrative purpose, I applied the method developed by Seiford & Zhu (1998a), in
27Stability analysis can be conducted on both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient DMUs. However, given that we
are merely interested in eﬃcient funds, only the ﬁrst analysis is needed. Unfavorable changes may include
DEA-model change, diminution or augmentation of the number of DMUs in the sample, data variations,
etc. Here, I restricted my attention to the eﬀect of data variations on eﬃcient DMUs. For a review of the









































6which the inputs and the outputs of the test DMU are worsened (decreased outputs and in-
creased inputs) while those of other DMUs are improved (decreased inputs and/or increased
outputs). Since this framework corresponds to the worst scenario, the mathematical opti-
mization solution provides the largest stability region than any other methods. Besides, it
is shown that this technique yields more exact robust results compared to those obtained
by other methods (Zhu 2001). The mathematical program is presented in Appendix 3. Ta-
ble 5 reports the results obtained under a CCR moment-based framework with mean and
skewness as outputs, standard deviation and kurtosis as inputs. Let δ and τ denote the
percentage variations of the inputs and outputs tested. As shown by Seiford & Zhu (1998a)
and Zhu (2001), when there are simultaneous changes in inputs and outputs of all DMUs




1 − Γk ≤ τ ≤ 1, then DMUk remains
eﬃcient. In Table 5, input increase (%) and output decrease (%) indicate the diﬀerence
between the lower bound and the upper bound of δ and τ respectively. According to the
results, fund 35 is the most stable among eﬃcient funds as its inputs (outputs) can be in-
creased (decreased) within the largest range without altering its eﬃciency score: an increase
up to 10.78% of inputs along with a decrease up to 12.10% of outputs. By contrast, fund
1 is the less stable eﬃcient fund because of its quite small range of unfavorable variations
allowed: an increase of only 1.09% of inputs and a decrease of only 1.10% of outputs. Other
things being equal, fund 35 is undoubtedly preferable to fund 1.
Table 5: Results of eﬃciency stability analysis under the moment-based model
Eﬃcient funds Γa Input increaseb Output decreasec
(%) (%)
1 IKOS Equity 0.022 1.09 1.10
11 AJR International 0.182 8.71 9.54
27 Key Europe 0.167 8.01 8.71
28 TR Kingsway A 0.101 4.92 5.18
35 Zulauf Europe 0.227 10.78 12.10
Note: The moment-based model denotes the use of mean and skewness
as outputs, standard deviation and kurtosis as inputs.
aΓ is the optimal value of the objective function issued from the
model reported in Appendix 3.
bInput increase (%) = (
√
1+Γ− 1) ∗ 100
cOutput decrease (%)=(1 −
√
1 − Γ) ∗ 100
When the sensitivity analysis program is infeasible (i.e. no solution is reached), which
is not the case of my example, Seiford & Zhu (1998a) and Zhu (2001) showed that the
test eﬃcient fund can inﬁnitely increase its corresponding inputs and decrease inﬁnitely its
outputs while maintaining its eﬃciency. In this situation, the fund in question is located
at an extreme position in one input or output (Seiford & Zhu 1998b). Conceptually, it can









































6other funds. Consequently, this input (output) is attributed an excessively high weight in
the evaluation process so that any unfavorable change can not aﬀect its eﬃcient status.
However, should we always choose this extreme fund? It is important to keep in mind that
extreme eﬃcient funds are not necessarily the best ones to choose. In this case, investors
should identify the extreme input or/and output in order to know if this input or/and
output correspond(s) eﬀectively to the criteria that they appreciate the most in comparison
to other criteria.
6 Concluding remarks
Previous empirical studies have documented that DEA could be a good tool to evaluate fund
performance, especially the performance of hedge funds as it can incorporate multiple risk-
return attributes characterizing hedge fund’s non normal return distribution in an unique
performance score. In this paper, I showed that DEA is a particularly suitable tool to
select hedge funds when investors must face multi-dimensional constraints (which is quite
often the case), especially when each one is associated to diﬀerent priority levels. Each
investor can tailor his own DEA model to incorporate his selection criteria and his personal
preferences for each criterium. In other words, the ﬂexibility of DEA in terms of the number
of selection criteria possibly included as well as of the control of weighting system (the
relative importance attributed to each selection criteria) can help investors choose the most
suitable funds that ﬁt their ﬁnancial, risk-aversion, diversiﬁcation and investment horizon
constraints.
This study is diﬀerent from previous studies in several points. One the one hand, instead
of applying DEA to evaluate empirically the performance of a large sample of hedge funds
including several categories, I generalized the framework and extended it to the selection
of hedge funds. On the other hand, I focused on methodological issues like the choice of
inputs, outputs and the form of eﬃciency frontier. In this perspective, some numerical
examples are then given on a sample of 38 hedge funds to illustrate the case where investors
are concerned about fund returns and risks with various settings of alternative measures of
return and risk. I found that results on DEA eﬃcient funds are, in general, rather sensitive
to the choice of input and output parameters. This ﬁnding highlights the importance
of the choice of appropriate inputs and outputs as well as the speciﬁcation of additional
constraints corresponding eﬀectively to the selectors’ preferences. A comparison between
DEA (dichotomic) classiﬁcation and rankings provided by the traditional Sharpe and the









































6examinations of funds’ return distributions suggest that these two performance measures
might not properly price good surprises (extremely high positive returns). In this case,
DEA is a good supplement to improve the precision of selection tasks.
In my illustrative applications, I also introduced the sensitivity analysis to appraise
the robustness of eﬃcient funds. By providing a range of unfavorable variations (stability
region) in inputs or/and outputs within which an eﬃcient fund remains eﬃcient, such
analysis can be a complementary tool to diﬀerentiate eﬃcient funds so as to identify the
best ones. This range can also be considered as a security zone within which any error in
data does not aﬀect classiﬁcation results.
Like any other tools, DEA also has its pitfalls. One of the main weakness arises from
the way the eﬃciency frontier is formed. Under the DEA non-parametric framework, the
eﬃciency frontier is empirically determined from real observations. As a result, it is sensitive
to noises, the approach lumps noise and ineﬃciency together and calls the combination
ineﬃciency. The econometric approach, though attempts to distinguish the eﬀects of noise
from the eﬀect of ineﬃciency, confounds the eﬀects of misspeciﬁcation of functional form
with ineﬃciency. However, compared with the free distributional approach taken by DEA,
which is particularly convenient to multi-criteria selection making when selectors have no
information about the relation form between these criteria, I believe that this cost is quite
small. Complementary tools as sensitivity analysis or statistical tests (if exist?) can be
helpful to mitigate this problem.
Appendices
A Appendix 1: Principles of incorporating evaluator prefer-
ence in siting analyses using DEA28
Table 6: Weights on criteria of ﬁve evaluators
Evaluator Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Sum
Evaluator 1 1.67 3.33 1.67 3.33 10
Evaluator 2 2.11 3.16 1.58 3.16 10
Evaluator 3 2.50 1.88 1.88 3.75 10
Evaluator 4 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 10
Evaluator 5 2.40 1.90 1.90 3.80 10
Average 2.14 2.45 1.81 3.61 10
In order to take into account the various views which the evaluators show in the Table









































66, lower and upper bounds are established in the following way. Let the weight for Criterion
i be ui. The ratio u2/u1 takes the value 3.33/1.67=2 for Evaluator 1, 3.16/2.11=1.5 for
Evaluator 2, 1.88/2.50=0.75 for Evaluator 3, 2.00/2.00=1 for Evaluator 4 and 1.90/2.40 for
Evaluator 5. Thus we have the range of the ratio u2/u1 as:
0.75 ≤ u2/u1 ≤ 2
In the same way we can ﬁnd the range of uj/ui as shown in the table below.
Table 7: Upper bound and lower bound ratio







B Appendix 2: Computing moment-based inputs and out-
puts
The inputs include lower mean ML, lower semi-standard deviation SDL, lower semi-skewness
SL and lower semi-kurtosis KL. The outputs contain upper mean MU, upper semi-standard
deviation SDU, upper semi-skewness SU and upper semi-kurtosis KU. They are computed


































(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
(n +1 ) m4 − 3(n − 1)m2
2
SD4
where ri is return at the month i, µ is the Minimum Accepted Return (MAR) approximated
by the average return on the 3-month US T-bill over the 5-year studied period (2000-2004),
n is the number of return observations. The skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) formulas are from
Kendall & Stuart (1958) (used by RATS and give the same results as EXCEL). ML, SDL,
SL and KL are obtained by using above formulas with all ri ≤ MAR. In a similar manner,
MU, SDU, SU and KU are calculated with all ri ≥ MAR. Note that partial skewness and
kurtosis are respectively put in cube and fourth roots so that they are in similar scale as









































6C Appendix 3: Eﬃciency sensitivity analysis for simultane-
ous changes in all inputs and outputs
Let I and O denote the input and output subset in which we are interested, then the CCR





λjxij ≤ (1 + Γk)xik, i ∈ I (29)
n 
j=1,j =k
λjxij ≤ xik, i  I (30)
n 
j=1,j =k
λjyrj ≥ (1 − Γk)yrk, r ∈ O (31)
n 
j=1,j =k
λjyrj ≥ yrk, r  O (32)
λj(j  = k) ≥ 0, Γ unrestricted. (33)
And the BCC sensitivity model is obtained by adding the constraint
n
j=1,j =k λj =1
into the problem (28)-(33).
Let δ and τ denote the percentage variation of the inputs and outputs tested. As
demonstrated by Seiford & Zhu (1998a) and Zhu (2001), when there are simultaneous





1 − Γk ≤ τ ≤ 1, then DMUk remains eﬃcient, where Γ is the optimal value to the
system(28)-(33). When such an optimizing program is infeasible, it is shown that the test
DMU’s eﬃciency will be always preserved however its inputs and outputs and those of the
others vary.
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